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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the change in maintenance strategy of
the LPH 2 class from the Regular Overhaul strategy to the
Phased Maintenance strategy to determine if a cost savings has
been achieved. Additionally, readiness was examined through
the use of operational availability data and C3/C4 casualty
report data to determine the impact of the change in
maintenance strategy on readiness. The results of the
analysis indicate that with the change in maintenance
strategy, a significant cost savings was realized by the Navy.
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1 . Navy Maintenance
United States Navy ships are among the most
sophisticated integrations of complex systems ever assembled
on earth. In addition to their complexity, these ships are
subjected to the most arduous environmental conditions and the
harshest of operational requirements throughout their service
life. For these reasons and others, Navy ships require
extensive maintenance on a regular basis to sustain battle
readiness. Much of the required maintenance is accomplished
at the depot level (i.e., in shipyards). Prior to the 1960's,
the only Navy depot level maintenance strategy was the
Overhaul. Under this plan, a ship entered a public or private
shipyard every three to five years, depending on class, and
all depot level repairs and preventive maintenance actions
requiring shipyard facilities were accomplished. Over the
last several decades, the U. S. Navy has developed five
principle maintenance strategies for the depot level
maintenance of its ships [Ref. l:Encl. l:p. 7].
Two of the Navy's depot maintenance strategies, the
Regular Overhaul and Phased Maintenance, are the focus of this
thesis. As mentioned earlier, the Regular Overhaul was the
only depot level maintenance strategy for the Navy until
recent years. Regular Overhauls encompass time periods
sometimes in excess of one year.
Phased Maintenance was developed in the early 1970 's,
partly in response to Congressional inquiry and a General
Accounting Office (GAO) report concerning the differences in
commercial shipping maintenance and the maintenance of Navy
ships of similar configuration. Commercial ships of the time,
despite spending far more time underway, spent little time in
shipyards and far less money on maintenance than their Navy
counterparts [Ref. 2:p. 1-11]. Reasons for the disparity are
discussed later. The Navy initially adopted the Phased
Maintenance Program for test purposes on one class of
auxiliary ships to improve readiness and operational
availability of the ships [Ref. 3:p. 4-6]. The program has
since grown to include over 150 ships. The Regular Overhaul
and Phased Maintenance strategies and other maintenance terms
are explained in further detail in Chapter II.
In the early 1980 's, the Navy changed the maintenance
strategy of the LPH 2 IWO JIMA class Amphibious Assault Ships
from the Regular Overhaul to Phased Maintenance for the
reasons discussed above.
2 . Navy Readiness
Readiness, the ability of a ship to carry out its
missions, is a difficult condition to evaluate and much more
difficult to quantify. Numerous attempts have been made to
quantify readiness and, more dangerously, attach a dollar
figure to it. As this thesis is being written, the United
States Congress is debating how much the President's defense
budget can be cut without adversely impacting readiness.
With the above in mind, the author has chosen two
common measurements of readiness to evaluate the change in
maintenance strategy of the LPH 2 class. The first measure
chosen is average number of days per year the ship was
available for operations (i .e
.
, out of the shipyard). This
measure offers a fairly straight forward indicator of one of
the primary goals of the Phased Maintenance Program, increased
operational availability. The other readiness measure
selected is the trends in C3 and C4 Casualty Reports
(Casreps). 1 The Casrep information will be evaluated in two
ways. First, the trend of all new Initial Casreps 2 will be
displayed and evaluated. Then, Casrep data of twelve selected
1Casreps - Reports (messages) sent by ships to higher
authority detailing an equipment failure, malfunction or
deficiency which cannot be corrected within 48 hours. C3
casreps represent a major degradation of a mission area. C4
casreps represent a complete loss of the ability to perform
in a mission area. [Ref. 4:Ch. 4:p. 1-5]
2Initial Casrep - There are four types of Casreps,
Initial Casreps report the initial problem, Update Casreps
report progress on the problem, Cascors report correction of
the problem and the little used casrep cancellation cancels
a casrep. [Ref. 4:Ch. 4:p. 1-5]
Equipment Identification Codes (EICs) 3 will be evaluated.
Casrep trend data has been selected to determine if a long
term improvement in equipment readiness resulted from the
change in maintenance strategy.
It should be noted that these two measurements of
readiness are not intended to provide an overall readiness
evaluation, rather, as stated, they are simply two of many
indicators of ship readiness.
B . PURPOSE
Though the decision to change maintenance strategies was
not driven primarily by cost considerations, in today's
environment of fiscal restraint all decisions must balance
cost concerns with, but not against, readiness.
The purpose of this thesis is to compare and analyze the
depot level maintenance costs of the LPH 2 class before and
after the Navy changed the maintenance strategy of the class
to determine if a cost savings has been realized.
Additionally, the cost data will be compared against the two
measurements of readiness introduced earlier to determine if
an improvement in readiness has occurred.
3EIC - An alphanumeric code used to identify a type or
individual piece of equipment. For example: 310C is the EIC
for a 60Hz Steam Turbine Driven Generator Set.
C. THE RESEARCH QUESTION
The research questions which will be examined and
discussed are as follows:
Did the change in maintenance strategy for the LPH 2 class
from a Regular Overhaul to Phased Maintenance result in a cost
savings to the Navy?
Did the change in maintenance strategy result in an
improvement in ship readiness as measured by trends in C3 and
C4 Casualty Reports?
Did the change in maintenance strategy result in an
improvement in ship readiness as measured by average days per
year the ship was available for operations?
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
This thesis will only analyze the actual depot level
maintenance cost associated with each of the two maintenance
strategies employed with the LPH 2 Class. No other costs
(i.e., differences in training costs caused by the change in
maintenance strategy, etc..) will be considered in the
analysis. Depot maintenance cost, schedule, and Casualty
Report data for all seven ships in the LPH 2 class for the
years 1979 through 1992 will be used. Lack of reliable cost
data prevents analysis of years prior to 1979.
The primary limitation on this research was in the
casualty report data. In order for this research to remain
unclassified, the data on C3 and C4 casreps was collected,
evaluated, and displayed by class vice individual ship.
Additionally, no attempt was made to normalize the aggregate




The first assumption made in the analysis of the data is
that the data is, in fact, an accurate reflection of the
actual cost of the depot level maintenance performed.
Second, it is assumed that no cost savings were realized
due to a learning curve. 4 This assumption is made for the
following reasons; 1) despite the fact that in some cases very
similar maintenance projects were accomplished, sufficient
differences exist between ships to nullify any possible
benefit; 2) depot level work was performed by a number of
different shipyards, and; 3) for shipyards performing
successive availabilities, sufficient amounts of time lapsed
between jobs to negate possible cost savings based on a
learning curve.
The third assumption was that the LPH 2 class is a
homogeneous class of ships (i.e., there are no significant
differences in configuration)
.
^Learning Curve - Theory forwarding the belief that as
a labor action is repeated, the amount of labor hours
expended to accomplish the action diminishes. This theory
is used extensively with labor intensive production lines.
[Ref. 5: p. 16-19]
F. DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS
Important definitions are explained in the text or are
found in footnotes. The list of abbreviations and Navy
acronyms for this area of research is too vast to included in
this chapter and therefore has been compiled as Appendix A.
G . METHODOLOGY
Introductory data on Navy maintenance policy, past and
present, were collected from instructions and notices
originated by the Chief of Naval Operations (NAVY STAFF) and
through conversations with Naval Sea Systems Command
personnel. Cost data for depot level maintenance of the LPH
2 class were obtained from the VAMOSC-SHIPS Management
Information System 5 , maintained by the Navy Center for Cost
Analysis and from the Commander, Naval Sea Systems
Command (NAVSEA) . Depot maintenance schedule data was received
from NAVSEA Detachment PERA (SURFACE) 6 . Casualty report data
was obtained from NAVSEA in the form of Annual Casrep Trends
Reports and Quarterly Casrep Trends Reports, and from American
Management Systems in the form of AD-HOC Data Request.
5VAMOSC - An acronym for Visibility and Management of
Operating and Support Costs and is a data base that contains
reams of operating cost data for every ship in the Navy.
6PERA - An acronym for Planning and Engineering for
Repairs and Alterations.
H. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
This thesis is divided into six chapters beginning with
this introduction, followed by three appendices.
Chapter II provides some background on the echelons of
ship maintenance as well as the different maintenance
strategies of the Navy and the various maintenance
availabilities associated with these strategies.
Additionally, Chapter II gives some background of the LPH 2
class.
Chapter III will identify the costs associated with depot
level maintenance of the LPH 2 class using the Regular
Overhaul strategy until the mid 1980 ' s and the Phased
Maintenance strategy thereafter.
Chapter IV will identify and provide data for the two
measurements of readiness to be assessed for the LPH 2 class.
Chapter V contains an analysis of the cost and readiness
measurement data collected and an interpretation of the
analysis.
The final chapter provides a brief summary of the
findings, conclusions and recommendations.
Appendix A provides a listing of commonly used terms and
Navy acronyms to assist with the understanding of this
thesis.
Appendix B displays the depot maintenance cost data
retrieved from the VAMOSC (SHIPS) Management Information
System in 1992 dollars.
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Appendix C provides the casualty report data received from
the Naval Sea Systems Command.
II. NAVY MAINTENANCE OVERVIEW
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the rather
complex system used to maintain Navy ships. The chapter will
provide some background on maintenance echelons, maintenance
strategies and the types of availabilities used with the
various strategies. Additionally, this chapter will provide
a brief background of the LPH 2 class of ships.
A. MAINTENANCE ECHELONS
In broad terms, Navy ship maintenance is divided into
three maintenance echelons. These echelons include 1)
organization level maintenance, 2) intermediate level
maintenance, and 3) depot level maintenance. [Ref. 6:p. 3]
1
. Organization Level Maintenance
Organization level maintenance is the lowest of the
maintenance echelons and, as the name implies, is work
performed by the organization, in this case the ship's crew.
This maintenance is more commonly known as "ship's force"
maintenance. Typical ship's force maintenance includes
facilities maintenance, routine system and component
preventive maintenance and corrective maintenance.
Additionally, ship's force personnel document deferred
maintenance actions, assist higher level maintenance
10
activities, and provide quality assurance of work performed by
other activities. [Ref. 6:Encl l:p. 1]
2 . Intermediate Level Maintenance
Generally, intermediate level maintenance is work that
is beyond the facilities and/or capabilities of the ship's
crew but short of the requirements for a shipyard. This level
of maintenance is normally carried out while a ship is in an
Intermediate Maintenance Availability (IMAV) and is performed
by Intermediate Maintenance Activities (IMAs) . In the case of
ships, the IMAs are either sea based tenders or shore based
SIMAs (shore IMAs) . It is important to note that in many
cases, IMAVs can be carried out while the ship is in port or
underway. [Ref. 6: End 2:p. 1]
3 . Depot Level Maintenance
Depot level maintenance, the highest echelon, is
maintenance that requires facilities or capabilities beyond
those of the organizational and intermediate levels. This
maintenance is performed by both public (Naval) and private
shipyards, Naval Repair Facilities (NRFs) and Item Depot
Facilities. [Ref. 6:Encl 3:p. 1]
Aspects of Navy depot level maintenance are the focus
of this thesis and are explained in further detail below.
B. U. S. NAVY DEPOT LEVEL MAINTENANCE
Depot level maintenance generally involves taking the ship
completely out of service or restricting its availability to
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the fleet for a period of time. This period of time can range
from a few weeks to a few years, depending on many factors.
Until the 1960's the Navy's policy was that each ship would
enter the "yards" once every three to six years, depending on
class, for an Overhaul. The purpose of the Overhaul was to
repair everything that was broken, install modernized
equipment, and perform preventive maintenance that could only
be accomplished in a shipyard. Aside from emergent
situations, the ships did not enter the shipyard again until
the next scheduled overhaul. Over the years, for cost,
operational availability and readiness reasons, the Navy has
developed five different depot level maintenance strategies to
maintain the large variation of ship types in the fleet. These
strategies are explained below.
1 . Depot Level Maintenance Strategies
The maintenance strategies currently in use by the
Navy include 1) Regular Overhaul, 2) Engineered Operating
Cycle, 3) Phased Maintenance, 4) Progressive Maintenance, and,
5) Incremental Maintenance Plan [Ref. l:Encl. l:p. 7]. These
strategies use a variety of availability types to accomplish
maintenance. These maintenance availability types will be
introduced and explained later in this chapter.
a. Regular Overhaul
The Regular Overhaul (ROH) was essentially the
only maintenance strategy used by the Navy before the 1960's.
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This strategy is one in which ships go into the shipyard once
every three to six years for depot level maintenance. Only
emergency depot level maintenance is performed in the interim.
Currently, this strategy is only used with very unique vessels
such as floating drydocks.
b. Engineered Operating Cycle
The Engineered Operating Cycle (EOC) was the first
new development in the Navy's maintenance policy. The EOC
expanded on the concepts of the ROH . In the EOC strategy,
scheduled overhauls continue to take place at extended but
regular intervals, however, other depot level maintenance is
performed in the interim. This additional maintenance takes
the form of Selected Restricted Availabilities and Docking
Selected Restricted Availabilities which are explained in
further detail later.
c. Progressive Maintenance
Progressive Maintenance (PROG) was the first
complete departure from the traditional overhaul mindset. In
Progressive Maintenance, all overhauls are eliminated and
replaced with a maintenance plan that only includes Selected
Restricted Availabilities and Docking Selected Restricted
Availabilities. This strategy was first introduced on the FFG
7 OLIVER HAZARD PERRY class frigates.
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d. Phased Maintenance
As stated in Chapter I, Phased Maintenance (PM)
was developed in response to Congressional inquiry in the late
1970' s. In that time frame, comparisons between maintenance
practices for commercially owned ships and those of Navy ships
of similar configuration revealed sharp differences in the
methods and costs of maintenance. Through the Phased
Maintenance strategy, the Navy has adopted several of the
common practices of commercial ship maintenance. These
practices include:
1. Use of short, repetitive availabilities vice long
overhauls (in the civilian world it is unheard of to keep a
ship out of use for 6 months or more)
.
2. Repair only items in need of repair (also known as
condition-directed repairs) . Traditionally, the Navy
maintenance community has used a time-directed repair
philosophy in which overhaul and repair of equipment were
performed based solely on time elapsed since last repair. [Ref
.
3:p. 6]
3. Use of a Port Engineer 7 to assess the actual material
condition of the ship and direct all depot level repairs. The
Port Engineer acts as the TYCOM 8 representative and works
closely with the ship's captain and crew to provide added
expertise. [Ref . 3:p. 11]
7 Port Engineer - A extremely knowledgeable marine
engineer responsible for the managing, planning, execution
and evaluation of all depot level maintenance on the ship.
[Ref. 3:p. 11]
8TYCOM - An acronym for Type Commander who is the
administrative superior in a ship's chain of command
responsible for maintenance funding.
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These changes, along with changes in contract
type, supply support and modernization planning, are what
distinguish Phased Maintenance from the other maintenance
strategies. In a typical five year Phased Maintenance cycle,
a Regular Overhaul is replaced by two three-month Phased
Maintenance Availabilities and one four-month Docking Phased
Maintenance Availability. [Ref. 3:p 6-8]
e. Incremental Maintenance Plan
The Incremental Maintenance Plan (IMP) is the most
recently developed maintenance strategy to date. This program
was developed for the Nimitz class nuclear powered aircraft
carriers. The IMP cycle begins with a Nuclear Refueling
Complex Overhaul (RCOH) and uses a combination of specialized
Phased Incremental Availabilities (PIA) and Docking PIAs
(DPIA) to maintain the carriers. [Ref. l:Encl. l:p. 3-7]
These availabilities are similar to those in the Phased
Maintenance Program and therefore, are not explained in
further detail in the following section.
2 . Types of Depot Level Maintenance Availabilities
There is a near endless list of general to very
specialized availability types for depot level maintenance.
This section won't attempt to list them all but rather will




Overhauls are major availabilities that usually
greatly exceed six months duration and are used for the
accomplishment of maintenance and modernization. There are a
number of specialized variations of overhaul availabilities
such as Regular, Complex and Engineered Overhauls (ROH, COH
and EOH) . Additionally, there are several specialized
overhaul availabilities for the refueling of nuclear powered
ships. [Ref. 6:Encl 3:p. 1]
b. Selected Restricted Availability
The Selected Restricted Availability (SRA) is a
relatively short, manpower intensive industrial period used
for the accomplishment of maintenance and selected
modernization. A common variation of the SRA is the (DSRA) or
Docking Selected Restricted Availability. A DSRA is an
expanded SRA which includes maintenance that requires the ship
to be drydocked. [Ref. 6: End. 3:p. 1]
c. Phased Maintenance Availability
The Phased Maintenance Availability (PMA) was
specifically developed to properly execute the Phased
Maintenance strategy. These availabilities typically last
three months and incorporate the advantages developed in the
Phased Maintenance strategy. The Docking Phased Maintenance
Availability (DPMA) is a variation of the PMA used when
maintenance necessitates the drydocking of the ship. [Ref.
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6: End. 3:p. 2] PMAs and DPMAs contracts are awarded to
shipyards utilizing both cost plus type and fixed price
contracts. To distinguish between contract types, the
commonly accepted terminology is to use PMA/DPMA when
referring to cost plus type contracts and PMF/DPMF when
referring to fixed price contracts.
d. Depot Modernization Period
The Depot Modernization Period (DMP) is an
availability used primarily for the installation of major,
high priority warfare improvement alterations [Ref. 6:End.
3:p. 1] . These types of availabilities are fairly rare as
much of this type work can be scheduled in other
availabilities.
C. LPH 2 IWO JIMA CLASS BACKGROUND
1 . General Information
The LPH 2 IWO JIMA class amphibious assault ships are
the first class of ships specifically designed to operate
helicopters. Each ship can carry a Marine battalion landing
team, including its vehicles, guns and equipment, plus a
squadron of support helicopters [Ref. 7:p. 690]. Table 2-1 on
the following page displays additional statistical data on the
class and is provided to give some idea of the size and
complexity of these ships.
17




Displacement (Light) 11250 Tons
Displacement (Loaded) 18300 Tons








CH 46 Sea Knights 20
OR
CH 53 Sea Stallions 11
OR
AV-8B Harriers 12
Source: Jane's Fighting Ship's 1993-94.
2. Ships of the LPH 2 Class
There are seven ships in the LPH 2 class of which LPH
3 and LPH 2 were decommissioned in 1992 and 1993,
respectively. LPH 7 is in service but is slated for
decommissioning in 1994. Table 2-2 on the following page is
provided to identify the ships of the class and shows some
pertinent data for the class.
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TABLE 2-2. LPH 2 CLASS HULL LISTING
Hull
Ship Name Number Commissioned Decommissioned
uss IWO JIMA LPH 2 26 AUG 1961 14 JUL 1993
uss OKINAWA LPH 3 14 APR 1962 17 DEC 1992
uss GUADALCANAL LPH 7 20 JUL 1963 In Service
uss GUAM LPH 9 16 JAN 1965 In Service
uss TRIPOLI LPH 10 6 AUG 1966 In Service
uss NEW ORLEANS LPH 11 16 NOV 1968 In Service
uss INCHON LPH 12 20 JUN 1970 In Service
Source: Jane's Fighting Ship's 1993-94
As evident in Table 2-2, the IWO JIMA class is unique
in that the hull numbers are not sequential. The reason is
that as these ships were being built other ships, primarily
older escort aircraft carriers, were being converted to LPHs.
Hence, CVE 106 USS BLOCK ISLAND, CVS 21 USS BOXER, CVS 37 USS
PRINCETON, CVE 90 THETIS BAY and CVS 4 5 VALLEY FORGE became
LPH 1, LPH 4, LPH 5, LPH 6 and LPH 8, respectively. All of
these ships were decommissioned prior to the 1970's. [Ref.
8:p. 465-467] In 1992 and 1993, as mentioned earlier, two
ships of the class, LPH 3 and LPH 2, were decommissioned and
will be replaced by larger and more capable LHD 1 USS WASP
class ships. Eventually all the ships in the IWO JIMA class
will be replaced by LHD 1 class ships.
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III. LPH 2 CLASS DEPOT LEVEL MAINTENANCE COST DATA
A. OVERVIEW
The period of time chosen for this research is the time
frame from January 1, 1979 through December 31, 1992. This
period allows for the analysis of a sufficient amount of data
under each maintenance strategy.
Although the decision to change the maintenance strategy
of the LPH 2 class occurred in February 1984, each ship of the
class did not move into the Phased Maintenance Program until
the completion of its first scheduled Regular Overhaul
following that date. As intended with the implementation of
the new maintenance strategy, each ship will be considered to
be under the ROH strategy up to and including its last regular
overhaul and under the PM strategy thereafter. The 14 year
time period chosen will allow for two data points under the
ROH strategy for each ship and from one to four data points
under the PM strategy for each ship. Figure 1 on the following
page illustrates the depot level maintenance availabilities
that will be used in the analysis. Additionally, Figure 1
graphically displays the time spans between various types of
availabilities.
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1979 80 81 82 83 1984 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 1992
LPH 2
| ROH ROH(*)-PMA DPMA-- |
LPH 3 | ROH ROH(*)--PMF |
LPH 7 | ROH ROH(*)— PMA PMA DPMA--PMAI
LPH 9 | ROH ROH(*) PMA DPMA--PMA |
LPH 10
|
ROH ROH (*) PMF--DPMF PMA |
LPH 11
|
ROH ROH (*) PMF— DPMF- |
LPH 12
|
ROH ROH ( * ) --PMA-PMA- DPMA- PMA |
(*) Denotes beginning of Phased Maintenance Strategy
Figure 1. LPH 2 Class Depot Maintenance History (1979-1992)
B. DEPOT MAINTENANCE SCHEDULE
Tables 3-1 through 3-7 on the following pages provide a
more detailed breakdown of the maintenance availabilities
displayed in Figure 1. The tables list the start date, end
date, and duration of each depot maintenance availability for
each ship that will be used in the cost analysis [Ref. 9:p.
1-4].
21









ROH 09/22/81 08/23/82 335
ROH 07/02/86 03/02/87 243
PMA 11/07/88 03/07/89 120
DPMA 08/13/91 11/21/91 100
Source: NAVSEA Det . PERA (SURFACE)









ROH 05/24/82 03/11/83 291
ROH 06/13/88 03/30/89 290
PMF 06/17/91 10/11/91 116
Source: NAVSEA Det. PERA (SURFACE)
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ROH 03/01/79 11/05/79 249
ROH 03/19/84 11/08/84 234
PMA 08/20/86 12/19/86 121
PMA 01/20/88 02/29/88 40
DPMA 03/10/90 08/17/90 160
PMA 10/15/92 01/29/93 106
Source: NAVSEA Det . PERA (SURFACE)









ROH 03/01/80 09/04/80 245
ROH 09/29/84 07/30/85 304
PMA 06/08/87 10/08/87 122
DPMA 04/03/89 08/04/89 123
PMA 09/26/91 12/20/91 85
Source: NAVSEA Det. PERA (SURFACE)
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ROH 05/23/80 02/22/81 275
ROH 08/05/85 06/06/86 305
PMF 05/23/88 08/26/88 95
DPMF 06/11/90 09/07/90 88
PMA 02/24/92 06/19/92 116
Source: NAVSEA Det. PERA (SURFACE)









ROH 02/24/81 12/07/81 286
ROH 10/06/86 09/28/87 357
PMF 10/23/89 01/26/90 95
DPMA 11/04/91 05/18/92 196
Source: NAVSEA Det. PERA (SURFACE)
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ROH 08/09/80 06/24/81 319
ROH 04/17/85 11/05/85 202
PMA 10/14/87 02/11/88 120
PMA 09/19/89 12/18/89 90
DPMA 04/01/91 06/25/91 85
PMA 09/29/92 12/02/92 64
Source: NAVSEA Det . PERA (SURFACE)
C. DEPOT AVAILABILITY COSTS
The cost figures for this research were taken from the
VAMOSC-SHIPS Management Information System which is maintained
by the Naval Center for Cost Analysis. The system takes
operating and support cost inputs from numerous sources and
assigns those costs to data elements [Ref. 10:p. 1-6]. The
major data elements in the system include:
Element 1.0 Direct Unit Costs
Element 2.0 Direct Intermediate Maintenance
Element 3.0 Direct Depot Maintenance
Element 4.0 Indirect Operating and Support
Each of these elements is subdivided into components which
are again subdivided into more precise components to break
costs down sufficiently to be useful to the users. All of the
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costs which are the focus of this paper are within Element 3.0
Direct Depot Maintenance. Table 3-8 displays the various cost
elements used in this research and gives a brief description
of the element.
TABLE 3-8. VAMOSC COST ELEMENT DESCRIPTIONS
ELEMENT DESCRIPTION
3.0 Direct Depot Maintenance
3.1 Scheduled Ship Overhaul
3.1.1 Regular Overhaul (ROH)
3.1.2 SRA, DSRA, PMA, or DPMA
3.2 Non-Scheduled Ship Repair
The actual cost data taken from the VAMOSC Management
Information System is displayed in Tables B-2 through B-8 in
Appendix B.
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IV. READINESS MEASUREMENT DATA
A. OVERVIEW
As stated in Chapter I, two measurements of readiness have
been selected to evaluate the change in maintenance strategy
of the LPH 2 class. The first measure discussed is the trends
in C3 and C4 casualty report data. The second measure is
operational availability which is defined, for the purpose of
this research, as "out of the shipyards." This definition
obviously doesn't, nor is it intended to, take into account
other situations in which the ship would be unavailable for
operations (i.e., when the ship is in a standdown period, or
during work ups, etc..)
.
B. CASUALTY REPORT DATA
The casualty report data was obtained from the data base
maintained by the Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command. Every
Casrep generated by every ship in the Navy is entered into
this data base. Once entered, the data can be retrieved using
a variety of parameters. It should be noted that when a ship
enters a depot level maintenance availability, it is removed
from the casrep system and all of the ship's casreps are
cancelled. This is done because the casrep system was
designed to give parts and technical assistance priority to
ships in service. When a ship enters a depot level
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availability, it is no longer in service and thus doesn't rate
the higher priority.
As stated earlier, only initial casreps were used in the
analysis. This was done to eliminate the repeat counting of
the same casrep item that would occur if update and correction
casreps were included. No attempt has been made to qualify or
disqualify any of the data for any reason. In other words,
the casrep numbers are presented as they appear in the data
base. It should be noted that with this data base, as with
all data bases, the quality of the output is only as good as
the quality of the input and there are many factors that
influence the input. Some of those factors include but are
not limited to the following:
1) Commanding Officer's Discretion - For a given level of
degradation of a piece of equipment one CO may casrep the item
while another CO, for any number of reasons, may chose not to
casrep the item.
2) Supply Support - Often times a piece of equipment is
casreped not because it fits the description of what should be
casreped but because a higher priority supply code can be used
for parts when the item is casreped.
3) Higher Authority - Occasionally items are casreped as
directed by higher authority. In these situations, "higher
authority" has identified a reason for all commands holding a
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certain piece of equipment to casrep it. The obvious result
is a spike in the figures in NAVSEA's data base.
4) Equipment Identification Codes - With thousands of
sometimes vague EICs to chose from, differences between what
one person will determine to be the "correct" EIC to that of
another person are routine.
The first two of these factors are impossible to account
for, so, for the purpose of this paper, they are assumed to
average out and have no real impact on the data. The third
concern represents a fairly rare occurrence and will not be
considered in the analysis. The fourth factor is one that has
the potential to influence, for better or worse, the casrep
totals. To avoid this problem, a selection criteria for the
twelve EICs to be analyzed was that these EICs were clearly
identified and had little chance of misidentification. A
second criteria was that EICs chosen had to be for equipment
that was traditionally overhauled in ROH availabilities. The
selected EICs are shown in Table 4-1 on the following page.
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TABLE 4-1. SELECTED EQUIPMENT IDENTIFICATION CODES
EIC DESCRIPTION
310C 60HZ Steam Turbine Driven Generator Set
F101 D-Express Header Type Boiler (Main Steam;
YC04 Boat Davits
FB01 Motor Driven Main Circulating Pump
P3*l AN/SPS 4 Radar Set
5ZEA MK 115 MOD Guided Missile Fire Control Sys
T503 Direct Expansion (R-12) Refrigeration Plant
F303 Turbine Driven Main Feed Pump (Centrifugal
F401 Blower Group (Combustion, Main Propulsion'
TM04 Anchor Windlass
F308 Turbine Driven Main Feed Booster Pump
TU01 Deck Edge Elevators
The Casualty Report data obtained from the Commander,
Naval Sea Systems Command is displayed in Tables C-2 through
C-5 in Appendix C.
C. OPERATIONAL AVAILABILITY DATA
As stated above, the author's definition of "available for
operations" is anytime the ship is not in the shipyard
undergoing depot level maintenance. To determine time
available for operations, several pieces of information must
be known about each ship. The first piece of data necessary
is the total time period of the study. As mentioned
previously, the time period is January 1, 197 9 through
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December 31, 1992, a period of 5,114 days. Next, the number
of days operating under each of the two maintenance strategies
for each ship must be determined. This can be done by
determining the first day that each ship entered into the
Phased Maintenance Program, then calculate the number of days
back to 1/1/79 and forward to 12/31/92. The final information
needed is the total number of days each ship spent in the
shipyard under each type of maintenance availability. This
data was provided in Tables 3-1 through 3-7 in Chapter III.
Table 4-2 below provides all the necessary data in tabular
format.
















LPH 2 03/03/87 2,983 578 2,131 220
LPH 3 03/31/89 3,742 581 1,372 267
LPH 7 11/09/84 2,139 483 2,975 427
LPH 9 07/31/85 2,403 549 2,711 330
LPH 10 06/07/86 2,714 580 2,400 299
LPH 11 09/29/87 3,193 643 1,921 291
LPH 12 11/06/85 2,501 521 2,613 359




This chapter provides an analysis of the five VAMOSC cost
elements chosen for this research. As previously stated, the
cost elements are 3.0 Total Depot Level Maintenance, 3.1
Scheduled Ship Overhaul, 3.1.1 Regular Overhaul, 3.1.2
PMAs/DPMAs, and 3.2 Non Scheduled Ship Repair. Following the
analysis of the depot level maintenance cost data, the trends
in C3/C4 casualty report data are displayed. The final
portion of this chapter will be an analysis of the operational
availability data.
B. DEPOT MAINTENANCE COST DATA ANALYSIS
Usually, analysis of cost data would first require
converting the data to constant dollars. Fortunately, the
Naval Center for Cost Analysis was able to provide the data in
constant 1992 dollars, calculated using NAVCOMPT inflation
indices. This is particularly beneficial because different
portions of cost elements are subject to different inflation
rates. For example, labor cost would not necessarily be
inflated at the same rate as material costs. It would have
been difficult to duplicate the accuracy of this method.
The five cost elements chosen for analysis were broken
down into three categories. The first category is cost
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elements where only an observation of the general trend in
cost is desired. These elements include element 3.0, Total
Depot Maintenance Costs and element 3.2, Non-Scheduled Ship
Repair. This category will be presented first using the
aggregate cost figures and then will be normalized using
shipyard months. 9 The second category is cost elements in
which the data will be manipulated to determine an average
cost per day of the two maintenance strategies. The elements
include 3.1.1, Cost of Regular Overhaul and element 3.1.2,
Cost of PMAs and DPMAs . The third category is element 3.1,
the arithmetic sum of elements 3.1.1 and 3.1.2, which serves
no purpose other than to show the total amount spent in the
depot level availabilities.
The first area of analysis is the 3.0 cost element. As
stated earlier, this element covers all depot maintenance
costs, including cost incurred under the Fleet Modernization
Program (FMP) . Because costs of fleet modernization are
independent of maintenance strategy, this cost element was not
scrutinized, rather, the general spending trend of the element
was observed. Figure 2 on the following page displays the
trend in the aggregate annual costs for the 3.0 cost element.
With the exception of the year 1985, there is a general
9Shipyard Months - Author's term to describe the total
number of months spent in the shipyard in a given year for
all ships in the class. Calculated using total number of
days in availabilities from Tables 3-1 through 3-7 and
dividing by 30.
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downward trend in the amount of money expended in this cost
element. The surge in cost in 1985 was due to the
accomplishment of three ROH availabilities is a single year,



















1979 1982 1985 1988 1991
CALENDAR YEAR
Figure 2 . Trends in Cost Element 3 .
The cost data was then normalized using shipyard months.
The annual values for shipyard months were calculated using
the data in Tables 3-1 through 3-7 and the results are found
in Table 5-1 on the following page.
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TABLE 5-1. SHIPYARD MONTHS PER YEAR (CLASS TOTAL)
YEAR SY MONTHS YEAR SY MONTHS YEAR SY MONTHS
1979 8.3 1984 10.9 1989 17.9
1980 20.4 1985 18.6 1990 9.1
1981 20.5 1986 18.4 1991 14.8
1982 15.2 1987 18.1 1992 13.2
1983 2.3 1988 14.4
When the data in Figure 2 was normalized using the
shipyard months in Table 5-1, the graph was much less erratic.
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1979 ' ' 1982 ' ' 1985 1988
CALENDAR YEAR
1991
Figure 3 . Cost Element 3 . Per Shipyard Month
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Figure 3 also shows a downward trend. Visual inspection
reveals that the average cost per shipyard month was in excess
of $7.5 million in the early to mid 1980's and below $5
million in the late 1980's and early 1990's. Interestingly,
1983 went from a deep valley in Figure 2 to a tremendous spike
in Figure 3. This was due to a relatively small aggregate
cost total spread over a very low number of shipyard
months (2.3) .
The next area of analysis is the 3.2 cost element. This
element, covering non scheduled ship repair, was also observed
solely for general trends in costs. As with the 3.0 element,
the general trend was clearly downward. Figure 4 below
displays the trend graphically.




































1979 1982 1985 1988 1991
CALENDAR YEAR
Figure 4 . Trends in Cost Element 3 .
2
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As with the 3.0 cost element, cost element 3.2 was then
normalized using the same values for shipyard months. The
results are displayed in Figure 5. Again with the exception
of 1983, there is a clear downward trend. The severe anomaly
in 1983 would lead one to believe that there may exist an
error in the data.
NON SCHEDULED SHIP REPAIR
(PER SHIPYARD MONTH)
1979 1982 1985 1988
CALENDAR YEAR
1991
Figure 5. Cost Element 3.2 Per Shipyard Month
The next area of analysis is with cost elements 3.1.1 and
3.1.2, cost of Regular Overhauls and cost of PMAs/DPMAs
respectively. Costs in the 3.1.1 cost element are associated
with the ROH strategy while cost in the 3.1.2 cost element are
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associated with the PM strategy. To compare the costs of
these elements to one another, a value for average cost per
day that a ship was under each of the two maintenance
strategies will be determined. The elements will be analyzed
together but will use different denominators to calculate the
values for average cost per day. The denominator for analysis
of the 3.1.1 cost element will be the total number of days in
one complete ROH cycle. 10 From Figure 1, it can be seen that
each of the ships in the class had two ROH availabilities
during the time period chosen for analysis. The ROH cycle
used for each ship will be from the day following the first
ROH availability listed through the last day of the second ROH
availability.
The denominator for the 3.1.2 cost element will be the
total number of days that each ship was under the Phased
Maintenance strategy during the selected period of analysis.
That time period for each ship is from the day following the
last ROH availability through December 31, 1992. The
reasoning behind the different denominators is that with the
ROH strategy, there are time periods where there are
concentrations of very high costs followed by periods with no
costs. Using the time period from January 1, 1979 through the
last ROH availability (the period in which the ship was under
10ROH Cycle - The period from the first day following
an ROH availability through the last day of the subsequent
ROH availability.
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the ROH strategy) instead of a ROH cycle would cause the
average cost to be much higher for a ship with two ROH
availabilities in a span of five years than for a ship with
two ROH availabilities in the span of nine years. For example,
contrast LPH 3 and LPH 7 in Figure 1. With the PM strategy,
availabilities occur fairly frequently and spreading the
aggregate costs over the entire time period is more
appropriate
.
As can be seen by looking at the data in Appendix B and
comparing it to the tables listing the dates of the
maintenance availabilities in Chapter III, not all cost appear
to readily match an availability. This is caused primarily by
the large time span over which bills are received and paid.
This impacts the results in two ways. First, not all of the
cost of an availability are captured in the year(s) the
availability took place. Some costs are incurred before the
availability start date and some costs are not realized until
after the completion of the availability. For this reason,
the cost of the last ROH availability will include the 3.1.1
costs for a period beginning one year before the ROH start
date through a point two years after the completion date.
This method will account for the bulk of the costs of the
availability. Second, because not all cost are recognized in
the year the availability took place, the costs of some of the
PMAs/DPMAs may be understated since cost data may still be
accumulating for availabilities that took place in 1991/92.
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The following is an example of the calculations. For LPH
11 USS NEW ORLEANS, the last ROH availability occurred in
1986-87, from Table B-7 the total cost under the 3.1.1 cost
element for 1985-89 was $16,605,171; from Table 3-6, the ROH
cycle was 2,119 days, yielding an average cost per day of
$7,836. For the PM strategy, the aggregate cost of the 3.1.2
cost element was $17,574,361; from Table 4-2, the USS NEW
ORLEANS spent 2,400 days under the PM strategy, yielding an
average cost per day of $9,149. Note that these figures
represent the average cost per day that the ship was under the
different maintenance strategies not the average cost per day
that the ship was in depot level availabilities. Table 5-2 on
the following page provides the results of the calculations
for the remainder of the class as well as an average for the
class for both strategies. Figure 6 on the following page
displays the same information graphically.
TABLE 5-2. MAINTENANCE STRATEGIES: AVG COST/DAY
AVERAGE COST PER DAY
ROH STRATEGY PM STRATEGY
LPH 2 $ 8,370 $ 5,242
LPH 3 $ 35,410 $ 4,669
LPH 7 $ 18,441 $ 5,398
LPH 9 $ 20,498 $ 5,924
LPH 10 $ 7,801 $ 7,695
LPH 11 $ 7,836 $ 9,149
LPH 12 $ 18,134 $ 5,558























LPH2 LPH3 LPH7 LPH 9 LPH 10LPH 11 LPH 12 AVG.
HULL
I PM STRATEGY ] ROH STRATEGY
Figure 6. Maintenance Strategies: Avg Cost/Day
C. READINESS MEASUREMENT DATA ANALYSIS
1 . Casualty Report Data
Analysis of the casrep data is the least scientific
portion of this chapter. For purposes of evaluating
readiness, it is impossible to attribute individual casreps to
one maintenance strategy or the other, so the overall trend in
casreps through the years is what is desired. As stated in
Chapter I, the casrep data was provided for the entire LPH 2
class vice individual ship in order to keep the research
unclassified. However, because ships in depot level
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availabilities are not in the casrep system, the aggregate
casrep totals must be normalized to account for this
difference. The method chosen to normalize the data is by
available month. 11 By subtracting each of the numbers in Table
5-1 from the total month figure of 84, the available months
for each year can be calculated. The results are shown in
Table 5-3.
TABLE 5-3. AVAILABLE MONTHS (CLASS TOTAL)
YEAR AV MONTHS YEAR AV MONTHS YEAR AV MONTHS
1979 75.7 1984 73.1 1989 66.1
1980 63.6 1985 65.4 1990 74.9
1981 63.5 1986 65.6 1991 69.2
1982 68.8 1987 65.9 1992 70.8
1983 81.7 1988 69.6
Using the data in Table 5-3 to normalize the casrep
data found in Appendix C, the graph in Figure 7 was
constructed. Figure 7 displays the data broken down into C3
nAvailable Months - Author's term used to describe the
total number of months out of depot maintenance for a given
year and is essentially any month that is not a "shipyard
month." For any given year there are 84 total months (12
months X 7 ships) so,
Shipyard Months + Available Months = 84
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casreps, C4 casreps, and total C3/C4 casreps. For comparison
purposes, the aggregate casrep totals are displayed on the
following page in Figure 8. In both cases, the graphs show
two clear spikes with apexes in the years 1981 and 1989.
Further investigation of the data didn't reveal any clear
reason or pattern for either of the spikes. In both cases,
the increase in casreps was spread over a wide range of
equipment identification codes.
C3/C4 CASREP TRENDS
LPH 2 CLASS TOTALS
H—I—I—I—I—I—I—I—I—I—I—I—I—I-
1979 1982 1965 1988 ]991
CALENDAR YEAR
C3 C4 TOTAL














Figure 8. Class Totals for C3/C4 Casreps
The next area of analysis is with the C3/C4 casreps
of the 12 selected EICs. The data from Appendix C has been
normalized and displayed graphically in Figures 9 through 12
on the following pages. With these figures only the total of
C3/C4 casreps for each EIC are displayed. The data reveals
that in most cases the trend in C3/C4 casreps improved (less
casreps) or at worst stayed about the same. Two EICs, 310C
and P3*l appeared to follow the spikes that appeared in the




















1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
CALENDAR YEAR
-m- EIC: 310C -* EIC: YC04-^ EIC: F401

















1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
CALENDAR YEAR
-m- EIC: F101 EIC: FB01 *- EIC: TM04




1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
CALENDAR YEAR
-m- EIC: P3*1 EIC: T503 + EIC: F308
















1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
CALENDAR YEAR
• EIC: 5ZEA • EIC: F303 * EIC: TU01




. Operational Availability Data
Analysis of the operational availability data is
fairly straightforward. The data, first presented in Table 4-
2, is displayed again in Table 5-4.
















LPH 2 03/03/87 2,983 578 2,131 220
LPH 3 03/31/89 3,742 581 1,372 267
LPH 7 11/09/84 2,139 483 2,975 427
LPH 9 07/31/85 2,403 549 2,711 330
LPH 10 06/07/86 2,714 580 2,400 299
LPH 11 09/29/87 3,193 643 1,921 291
LPH 12 11/06/85 2,501 521 2,613 359
TOTAL DAYS IN PERIOD FOR ALL SHIPS = 5,114 DAYS
Applying the above data to Equations (1) and (2), the
percentage of time that each ship was available for operations
under both strategies can be determined.
1 - Days in ROH Availabilities
Days Under ROH Strategy
(1)
1 -
Days in PMAs & DPMAs
Days Under PM Strategy
(2)
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By multiplying the percentages by 365, the number of
days per year each ship was available for operations can be
determined. Table 5-5 displays the results of the
calculations
.
TABLE 5-5. MAINTENANCE STRATEGIES: TIME AVAILABLE









LPH 2 81.6 298 89.7 327
LPH 3 84.5 308 80.5 294
LPH 7 77.4 283 85.6 312
LPH 9 77.2 282 87.8 320
LPH 10 78.6 287 87.5 319
LPH 11 79.9 292 84.9 310
LPH 12 79.2 289 86.3 315
Averaging the data in Table 5-5 across all the ships
in the class results in the data found in Table 5-6 below.
TABLE 5-6. OPERATIONAL AVAILABILITY: CLASS AVERAGE









AVG. 79.6 291 86.0 314
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
The objective of this thesis was to compare the depot
level maintenance costs for the LPH 2 class before and after
a change in maintenance strategy to determine if a cost
savings has been realized. Additionally, analysis of two
measures of readiness were to be made to determine if a
change, for better or worse, had occurred in the readiness of
the ships. With those objectives in mind, the research
questions are restated and answered below.
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
As a result of the research, the research questions are
answered as follows:
1 . Did the change in maintenance strategy for the LPH 2
class from Regular Overhaul to Phased Maintenance
result in a cost savings to the Navy?
To answer this question, two areas will be discussed.
First, in the case of the two cost elements in which only
observation of general trends was desired, Figures 2 through
5 indicate a downward trend in annual costs. With cost
element 3.0 representing Total Depot Maintenance, the
normalized data showed a clear downward trend with the
exception of a spike in 1983. From the numbers, the apparent
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cause of the spike was a modest level of expenditure spread
over a meager 2.3 shipyard months. However, because the spike
is so severe, the author is assuming that there is an error in
some of the data. With cost element 3.2 representing Non
Scheduled Ship Repair, a similar spike appeared in 1983 in the
normalized plot. While this spike can not be "explained
away", the trend of this cost element was sharply downward.
The second area to be discussed is the actual cost of
the maintenance availabilities, cost element 3.1.1 for the
Regular Overhaul strategy and cost element 3.1.2 for the
Phased Maintenance strategy. The results, as evident in Table
5-1 and Figure 4, are more profound. With an average daily
cost of $16,641 under the ROH strategy and $6,234 under the PM
strategy, it is clear that the Phased Maintenance strategy has
resulted in a cost savings to the Navy.
There are other factors that contributed to the
difference in costs such as shrinking resources and
improvements in preventive maintenance, to name a couple.
However, the majority of the cost savings is appropriately
attributed to the new maintenance strategy.
2 . Did the change in maintenance strategy result in an
improvement in ship readiness as measured by trends in
C3 and C4 Casualty Reports?
As previously stated, the casrep analysis was the
least scientific of the group. The casreps taken as a whole
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displayed two unexplainable spikes, one before the change in
maintenance strategy ( 1981) and one well after the
change (1989) , which would seem to indicate that the number of
casreps is independent of the maintenance strategy. However,
when casrep trends of the selected EICs were observed, the
results were different. Trends for most of the EICs either
improved or stayed about the same, while trends for two seemed
to mirror the trends of total casreps and the trend for one
EIC got worse. While the degree of improvement resulting from
the change in maintenance strategy could be argued, there is
no argument to the contrary. The stronger point to be made
here is that with the move from the traditional "time directed
repairs" to the newer and far less expensive concept of
"condition directed repairs", there was no apparent increase
in the number of equipment failures.
3. Did the change in maintenance strategy result in an
improvement in ship readiness as measured by average
days per year the ship was available for operations?
Over the time span of this thesis it is clear that
under the Phased Maintenance strategy the operational
availability of the ships in the class improved. The
percentage of time the ships were available for operations
increased from 79.6% to 86.0% on average. In terms of average
number of days per year the ships were available for
operations the figures were 291 days/year for the Regular
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Overhaul strategy and 314 days/year for the Phased Maintenance
strategy, again demonstrating the improvement.
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The first area for further research that comes to mind is
a continuation of cost comparisons of various maintenance
strategies. Many of the ship classes currently in service in
the Navy have changed from one maintenance strategy to another
over the years. Research similar to that conducted in this
thesis could be applied to other ship classes.
Along the same lines, research that attempts to capture
all of the cost differentials for the different maintenance
strategies would be useful. For example, as mentioned
earlier, the difference in training cost incurred due to the
different maintenance strategies is likely to be significant.
That is to say, for a ship to go into the shipyard for 100
days vice 300 days, crew turnover would be less and therefore
the number of new individuals requiring training would
decrease. If reliable data could be found, training cost and
other cost could be included in the analysis. Possibly the
greatest cost differential to be studied would be the
difference in the number of ships needed in a given class
under different maintenance strategies. In other words, if
the average operational availability for a class of 30 ships
could be improved by 6%, would the Navy need 30 or would 27 be
sufficient?
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Another area for further research would be to analysis
ship classes that currently utilize the Engineered Operating
Cycle strategy (such as the CG 47 class) to determine the
feasibility of converting the class to the Phased Maintenance
strategy to increase operational availability (this would be
rather technical and would probably require more than one
thesis to analyze a class).
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APPENDIX A. LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
CASREP Casualty Report
CO Commanding Officer
COH Complex Overhaul Availability
DMP Depot Modernization Period
DPIA Docking Phased Incremental Availability
DPMA Docking Phased Maintenance Availability
DPMF DPMA (Fixed Price Contract)
DSRA Docking Selected Restricted Availability
EIC Equipment Identification Code
EOC Engineered Operating Cycle (Strategy)
EOH Engineered Overhaul Availability
GAO Government Accounting Office
IMA Intermediate Maintenance Activity
IMAV Intermediate Maintenance Availability
IMP Incremental Maintenance Plan (Strategy)
LPH Designation for Amphibious Assault Ship
NAVCOMPT Office of the Comptroller of the Navy
NAVSEA Naval Sea Systems Command
NRF Naval Repair Facility
NSY Naval Shipyard


















PMA (Fixed Price Contract)
Progressive Maintenance (Strategy)
Restricted Availability
(Nuclear) Refueling COH Availability
(Nuclear) Refueling Overhaul Availability
Regular Overhaul Availability (Strategy)




APPENDIX B. VAMOSC (SHIPS) COST DATA
The following tables display the cost data retrieved from
the Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs
(VAMOSC) Management Information System. The cost values are
expressed in 1992 dollars as inflated using NAVCOMPT inflation
indices. [Refs. 10, 11, and 12]
TABLE B-l. VAMOSC COST ELEMENT DESCRIPTIONS
ELEMENT DESCRIPTION
3.0 Direct Depot Maintenance
3.1 Scheduled Ship Overhaul
3.1.1 Regular Overhaul (ROH)
3.1.2 SRA, DSRA, PMA, or DPMA
3.2 Non-Scheduled Ship Repair
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APPENDIX C. C3/C4 CASUALTY REPORT DATA
The following tables display the C3 and C4 casualty report
data provided by NAVSEA. Table C-l provides a description of
the twelve selected equipment identification codes. Table C-2
displays the total number of C3/C4 casualty reports for all
equipment identification codes and Tables A-3 through C-5
provide C3/C4 casrep numbers for the selected EICs.
TABLE C-l. SELECTED EQUIPMENT IDENTIFICATION CODES
EIC DESCRIPTION
310C 60HZ Steam Turbine Driven Generator Set
F101 D-Express Header Type Boiler (Main Steam)
YC04 Boat Davits
FB01 Motor Driven Main Circulating Pump
P3*l AN/SPS 40 Radar Set
5ZEA MK 115 MOD Guided Missile Fire Control Sys.
T503 Direct Expansion (R-12) Refrigeration Plant
F303 Turbine Driven Main Feed Pump (Centrifugal)
F401 Blower Group (Combustion, Main Propulsion)
TM04 Anchor Windlass
F308 Turbine Driven Main Feed Booster Pump
TU01 Deck Edge Elevators
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TABLE C-2. TOTAL C3/C4 CASREPS FOR THE LPH 2 CLASS
YEAR CASREPS YEAR CASREPS YEAR CASREPS
1979 77 1984 55 1989 140
1980 100 1985 43 1990 96
1981 170 1986 58 1991 64
1982 135 1987 82 1992 60
1983 141 1988 102
TABLE C-3. C3/C4 CASREP DATA FOR SELECTED EICs
EQUIPMENT IDENTIFICATION CODES
YEAR 310C F101 YC04 FB01
1979 4 19 1 2
1980 11 16 1
1981 13 24 1
1982 7 26 1











TABLE C-4. C3/C4 CASREP DATA FOR SELECTED EICs
EQUIPMENT IDENTIFICATION CODES
YEAR P3*l 5ZEA T503 F303
1979 2 1 3
1980 3 3 3
1981 4 3 1 1
1982 2 1





1988 12 6 1
1989 4 7 2
1990 3 4
1991 1
1992 1 4 1
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TABLE C-5. C3/C4 CASREP DATA FOR SELECTED EICs
EQUIPMENT IDENTIFICATION CODES
YEAR F401 TM04 F308 TU01
1979 3 1
1980 5 9 2 3
1981 7 3 4
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